Europe must turn Ukraine’s battlefield lessons into defence capacity

On the battlefield, drone designs can lose their value within months as opponents develop ways to jam or intercept them. Ukrainian soldiers and engineers respond by testing and updating systems, sometimes within weeks. Persistent surveillance makes movement visible and vulnerable, pushing forces to disperse and making drones a primary instrument of attack. Every brigade—and increasingly every company—needs its own drone and counter-drone capacity, the article argues.

Electronic warfare, secure communications and satellites are also essential. Yet technology cannot replace artillery, ammunition stocks, trained reserves or the ability to replace losses. Europe must produce quickly and in volume, including cheaper drones. Ukraine’s experience also points to a need for decentralized command and junior leaders who can improvise, with short feedback loops connecting front-line users and engineers.

European procurement, which can take years, struggles to keep pace with fast-changing battlefield technology. The article calls for quicker testing by soldiers, closer work with manufacturers and contracts that support continued upgrades. It argues that Europe needs lower-cost interceptors, guns and jammers to complement advanced air defences, and procurement built around adaptable systems, competing suppliers and multiyear ammunition orders. Ukraine’s digital marketplace, where troops receive points for verified combat missions and exchange them for hardware, is cited as a feedback model European armies lack.

The article urges the EU to pair Ukraine’s innovation with European capital, research and manufacturing, while protecting Ukraine’s own industrial capacity. It points to the EU-Ukraine Drone Alliance, launched in July, and joint ventures, shared testing and long-term orders as ways to build cooperation. In October, the European Commission opened a second call for €21.3 billion in loans under the €150 billion Security Action for Europe instrument and encouraged joint procurement with Kyiv. Ukraine’s association with the European Defence Fund and financing under the European Defence Industry Programme have also taken effect; the programme’s Ukraine Support Instrument provides about €300 million for production and innovation.

Military mobility is another vulnerability. Ukrainian Railways has moved troops, ammunition, grain and evacuees despite attacks, using alternate routes, diesel locomotives, decentralized dispatch and rapid repairs. By contrast, the article says, some European bridges and tunnels cannot carry heavy armour, permits can take weeks, and Ukraine’s rail gauge differs from that of most EU countries. The November 2025 sabotage of the Warsaw-Lublin line, a key aid route to Kyiv, underscored the risk to transport corridors. The EU is urged to upgrade infrastructure, simplify cross-border permits and coordinate with NATO, while drawing on Ukraine’s and Moldova’s logistics experience.

Faster procurement, the article says, must still include clear rules, proportionate checks and independent scrutiny. It also calls for the EU’s next long-term budget to retain at least the Commission’s proposed €131 billion for defence, security and space in the European Competitiveness Fund, and €17.65 billion for military mobility in the Connecting Europe Facility. Ultimately, national governments must decide whether to redesign units, revise procurement and fund production at scale. Ukraine, the article concludes, should be treated not only as a country receiving support but as a source of security for Europe.

Marcin Bużański, senior adviser to the Warsaw Security Forum, contributed to the article.